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  There are many surprises in logic. Peirce gave us a few. Russell gave Frege one. Löwenheim 
gave Zermelo one. Gödel gave some to Hilbert. Tarski gave us several. 
  When we get a surprise, we are often delighted, puzzled, or skeptical. Sometimes we feel or 
say “Nice!”, “Wow, I didn’t know that!”, “Is that so?”, or the like.  
  Every surprise belongs to someone. There are no disembodied surprises. Saying there are 
surprises in logic means that logicians experience surprises doing logic—not that among 
logical propositions some are intrinsically or objectively “surprising”. 
  The expression “That isn’t surprising” often denigrates logical results.  
  Logicians often aim for surprises.  In fact, [1] argues that logic’s potential for surprises helps 
motivate its study and, indeed, helps justify logic’s existence as a discipline. 
  Besides big surprises that change logicians’ perspectives, the logician’s daily life brings little 
surprises, e.g. that Gödel’s induction axiom alone implies Robinson’s axiom. Sometimes wild 
guesses succeed. Sometimes promising ideas fail.  Perhaps one of the least surprising things 
about logic is that it is full of surprises. 
  Against the above is Wittgenstein’s surprising conclusion ([2], 6.1251): “Hence there can 
never be surprises in logic”.  
  This paper unearths basic mistakes in [2] that might help to explain how Wittgenstein arrived 
at his false conclusion and why he never caught it. The mistakes include: unawareness that 
surprise is personal, confusing logicians having certainty with propositions having logical 
necessity, confusing definitions with criteria, and thinking that facts demonstrate truths. People 
demonstrate truths using their deductive know-how and their knowledge of facts: facts per se 
are epistemically inert. 
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